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ABSTRACT
The paper brings out the special mechanism through which taxes influence bilateral FDI, when
investment decisions are two-fold in the presence of fixed setup flows costs. For each pair of source-
host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate FDI flows will occur at all, and
a different set of factors determimnig the volume of FDI flows (provided that they occur). We
demonstrate that the notion that the mere international tax differetials are a key factor behind the
direction and magnitude of FDI flows is too simple. We argue that the source country tax rate works
primarely on the selection process, whereas the host-country tax rate affect mainly the magnitude
of the FDI, once they occur. We analyze international panel data with 24 OECD countries over the
period 1981-1998 by the Heckman selection method to bring evidence in support of this argument.
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"European countries have been steadily slashing corporate-tax
rates as they vie for foreign investment, potentially adding to
pressure on the U.S. for similar cuts as it weighs a tax overhaul.
Following the lead of Ireland, which dropped its rates to 12.5%
from 24% between 2000 and 2003, one nation after another has
moved toward ￿ atter, lower corporate rates with fewer loopholes"
(Wall Street Journal Europe, January 28-30, 2005).
Indeed, the economic literature has extensively dealt with the e⁄ects of
taxation on investment, going back to the well-known works of Harbeger
(1962) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Of particular interest in this era of
increasing globalization are the e⁄ects of international di⁄erences in tax rates
on foreign direct investment (FDI); see, for instance, Auerbach and Hassett
(1993), Hines (1999), Desai and Hines (2001), De Mooij and Ederveen (2001),
and Devereux and Hubbard (2003).
In this paper we attempt to provide a new look at the mechanisms through
which corporate tax rates in￿ uence aggregate FDI ￿ ows. Speci￿cally, we
assume "lumpy" setup costs for new investment. This speci￿cation, which
has been recently supported empirically by Caballero and Engel (1999, 2000),
creates a situation in which FDI decisions are two-fold: whether to export
FDI at all, and, if so, how much. These decisions are pair-wise: that is, they
are made by each source country with respect to each host country, as the
"lumpy" cost is speci￿c for each source-host pair.
In this context, the source and host tax rates may have di⁄erent e⁄ects on
these two decisions. This is the subject matter of our empirical investigation,
where we apply the Heckman selection method to international panel data
of OECD countries.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section provides
a simple conceptual framework for the analysis of the e⁄ects of taxation on
2two-fold FDI decisions. Section 3 presents the data and empirical ￿ndings.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Source and Host Taxation
Elsewhere (Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004)) we emphasize the two-fold
nature of investment decisions. In the presence of ￿xed setup costs of new
investment, a ￿rm determines how much to invest according to the standard
marginal productivity conditions. For this decision, the setup costs play no
role. But in the presence of ￿xed setup costs, the pro￿ts, that are generated
when the ￿rm carries out the amount of investment called for by marginal
productivity conditions, may be negative. Therefore, the ￿rm faces also
a decision whether to incur the setup costs and invest at all. Thus, the
investment decision of the ￿rm is two-fold: whether to invest at all, and
if so, how much to invest. Indeed, in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004)
we provide evidence in support of this two-fold mechanism of investment in
the context of foreign direct investment. Looking at aggregate FDI in￿ ows
and out￿ ows among all potential source-host pairs of OECD countries, we
￿nd a large proportion of such pairs with no FDI ￿ ows at all. Following
the two-fold decision mechanism, we accordingly estimate jointly a selection
equation (whether to invest all) and a ￿ ow equation (how much to invest).
The estimation results point out to the importance of ￿xed setup costs of
new investments for the determination of aggregate FDI ￿ ows.
Consider for concreteness the case of a parent ￿rm that weighs the de-
velopment of a new product line. We can think of the ￿xed setup costs as
the costs of developing the product line. The ￿rm may choose to make the
development at home and then carry the production at a subsidiary abroad.
This choice may be determined by some "genuine" economic considerations
such as source-host di⁄erences in labor costs, in infrastructure, in human
capital, etc. But it may also be in￿ uenced by tax considerations.
3In this context of FDI, there arises the issue of double taxation. The
income of a foreign a¢ liate is typically taxed by the host country. If the
source country taxes this income too, then the combined (double) tax rate
may be very high, and even exceeds 100%1. This double taxation is typically
relieved at the source country by either exempting foreign-source income
altogether or granting tax credits2. In the former case, foreign-source income
is subject to the tax levied by the host country only. When the source
country taxes its resident on their world-wide income and grants full credit
for foreign taxes, then in principle the foreign-source income is taxed at the
source-country tax rate, so that the host-country tax rate becomes irrelevant
for investment decisions in the source country. But, in practice, foreign-
source income is far from being taxed at the source country rate. First, there
are various reduced tax rates for foreign-source income. Second, foreign-
source income is usually taxed only upon repatriation, thereby e⁄ectively
reducing the present value of the tax. Thus, in practice, the host country
tax-rate is much relevant for investment decisions of the parent ￿rm at the
source country. The relevance of the host-country tax rate intensi￿es through
transfer pricing.
To highlight the issue of source-host di⁄erences in tax rates, suppose that
the source country does not tax foreign-source income at all. Denote the
￿xed cost of development by c. Now, if the host-country tax rate is lower
than that of the source country, then the parent ￿rm at the source country
attempts to keep this cost at home for tax purposes. The ￿rm may thus
charge its subsidiary arti￿cially low royalties for the right to produce the new
product. Thus, this cost remains largely deductible in the high-tax source
country. Denote the (maximized) present value of the cash ￿ ows arising from
the production and sale of the new product by v(￿H); as explained above,
it depends (negatively) on the corporate tax rate (￿H) levied by the host
1For a succinct review of this issue see, for exmaple, Hines(2001).
2This is also the recommendation of the OECD model tax treaty (OECD, 1997). A
similar recommendation is made also by the United Nations model tax treaty (U.N. 1980).
4country. Thus, the parent ￿rm will indulge into the project if
c(1 ￿ ￿S) ￿ v(￿H); (1)
where ￿S is the corporate tax rate in the source country3.
As is evident from condition (1), the tax rate in the source country, ￿S,
a⁄ects positively the decision by a parent ￿rm in country S whether to carry
a foreign direct investment in country H; whereas the tax rate in the host
country, ￿H; has a negative e⁄ect on this decision.
The amount of foreign direct investment is determined by the standard
marginal productivity conditions derived fromthe maximization of the present
value of the cash ￿ ows of the foreign subsidiary, after taxes paid in the host
country. Therefore, the tax rate in host country (￿H) has a negative e⁄ect
on the ￿ ow of FDI from S to H; whereas the tax rate in the source country
(￿S) is irrelevant for the determination of the magnitude of their ￿ ow.
3 Empirical Evidence
Our economic approach is based on Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004),
where attention is paid to the problems that arise when FDI ￿ ows are
"lumpy": FDI ￿ ows are actually observed only when their pro￿tability ex-
ceeds a certain (unobserved) threshold, as indicated by condition (1). There-
fore, the Heckman selection-bias method is adopted to jointly estimate the
likelihood of surpassing this threshold (the "selection" equation) and the
magnitude of the FDI ￿ ow, provided that the threshold is indeed surpassed
(the "￿ ow" equation).
3When the tax-allowed depreciation is close to the true physical (or economic) depre-
ciation, investments are ￿nanced primarily by debt, then v(￿H) may be approximated by
(1 ￿ ￿H)v0, where v0 is the pre-tax present value of the cash ￿ ows of the subsidiary; see,
for instance, Auerbach (2002), and Hasset and Hubbard (1996). In this case, condition
(1) is approximated by c[1 ￿ (￿S ￿ ￿H)] 5 v0 , where we note that (1 ￿ ￿S)=(1 ￿ ￿H) is
approximated by 1 ￿ (￿S ￿ ￿H).
5As was already pointed out in section 2, there are indeed H-S pairs for
which no FDI ￿ ows appear in the data (covering 18 years). This probably
indicates that the FDI ￿ ows called for by the standard marginal productivity
conditions are not large enough to surpass a certain threshold level as the one
described in condition (1), rather than that the desired ￿ ows, in the absence
of a threshold, are actually zero. The traditional Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) methods treat the no-￿ ow observations as either literally indicating
zero ￿ ows, and assign a value of zero for the FDI in these observations, or
discard these observations altogether. In both cases the estimates are biased.
We employ 3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting of
3 years). The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country character-
istics, such as GDP or GDP per-capita, population, educational attainment
(as measured by average years of schooling), language, ￿nancial risk ratings,
etc.; (2) S-H source-host pair, characteristics, such as S-H FDI ￿ ows, geo-
graphical distance, common language (zero-one variable), S-H ￿ ows of goods,
bilateral telephone tra¢ c per-capita as a proxy for informational distance,
etc.; (3) corporate-tax rates4. Table 1 describes the list of the 24 countries in
the sample, and whether they are observed in the sample (at least once) as a
source or host country (but most source countries do not have positive ￿ ows
more than with few host countries), and Table 2 describes the data sources.
The data employed in the empirical analysis are drawn from OECD re-
ports (OECD, various years) on a sample of 24 OECD countries, over the
period from 1981 to 1998. The FDI data are based on the OECD reports of
FDI exports from 17 OECD source countries to 24 OECD host countries5.
4We simply apply the statutory rates, because they are exogenously given. Average
e⁄ective tax rates, suggested by Deverux and Gri¢ th (2003) as determinants of the location
of invetsments, are endogenous in the sense that they are determined by the amount of
invetsment. To apply econometrically average e⁄ective tax rates, there is a need for a
good instrument. The statutory rate is the best available instrument.
5The OECD reports accurately on all rich and poor countries that are a host to OECD
FDI exports. But data are missing for non-OECD countries as a source of FDI exports.
This is the reason that we restrict our sample to the group of OECD countries, as potential
source and host countries, among themselves, with no missing data.
6Table 3 presents the e⁄ects of several potential explanatory variables of
the two-hold decisions on FDI ￿ ows. Our focus is on the role of the source
and host corporate-tax rates.
But we naturally include in the empirical analysis a host of standard ex-
planatory/control variables that are employed in studies of the determination
of FDI ￿ ows. We brie￿ y discuss these determinants ￿rst. They are analyzed
in details in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004). These variables includes
standard "mass" variables (the source and the host population sizes); "dis-
tance" variables (physical distance between the source and host countries
and whether or not the two countries share a common language); and "eco-
nomic" variables (source and host GDP per capita, source-host di⁄erences
in average years of schooling, and source and host ￿nancial risk ratings). In
addition, we include a dummy variable (previous FDI) to indicate whether
or not the source-host pair of countries have already established FDI rela-
tions between them in the past; such past relations may have some bearing
on the setup costs of establishing a new relation. As explained in detail in
Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004), the OLS estimates of the e⁄ects of these
variables are biased. This is true for both the OLS-D regression, where the
observations with no FDI ￿ ows are discarded (leaving only 851 observations
out of the 2116 observations in the full sample); and for the OLS-Zero regres-
sions, where the no-￿ ow observations were recorded as having FDI ￿ ows of
zero6. Note that the di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients between OLS-D and OLS-
Zero indicate that there exist non linear relationships between the dependent
variable and the independent variables. The Heckman method is suitable for
estimating such non linear relationships. The Heckman joint estimation of
the ￿ ow and selection equations are presented in the last two columns. We
exclude certain variables from the ￿ ow equation for identi￿cation. The re-
sults are more or less in line with ￿ndings in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka
6More accurately, as we measured FDI by logs, we put a large negative number for
these FDI ￿ ows.
7(2004). For instance, a high gap in education in favor of the source country
reduces the probability of having FDI ￿ ows to the host country. This is ex-
pected because a gap in years of schooling may be a proxy for a productivity
gap; see also Lucas (1990). The host ￿nancial risk rating a⁄ects positively
the ￿ ow of FDI, whereas the analogous variable of the source country is neg-
ative and signi￿cant in the selection equation. Finally, the existence of past
FDI relations is positive and signi￿cant in the selection equation, as it may
help to reduce the setup costs of establishing a new FDI ￿ ow.
We turn now to the main focus of the paper - the e⁄ect of corporate-
tax rates. First, the source corporate-tax rate is positive and signi￿cant in
the selection equation, as indeed predicted by condition (1) of the preceding
section. This rate plays no statistically signi￿cant role in the ￿ ow equation,
again in line with our analysis. The coe¢ cient of the host corporate-tax rate
is indeed negative, although insigni￿cant in the selection equation. But it
is negative and signi￿cant in the ￿ ow equation, again as predicted by our
analysis. Note that it is not merely the source-host tax di⁄erential (￿S ￿￿H)
which is the main determinant of FDI ￿ ows.
Interestingly, the role of the source and host corporate-tax rates is not
fully revealed by the traditional OLS regressions. In the regression (OLS-
D), only the host corporate-tax rate plays a statistically signi￿cant role in
reducing FDI ￿ ows to the host country; whereas in the other regression (OLS-
Zero), it is only the source corporate-tax rate which plays a statistically sig-
ni￿cant role in promoting FDI out￿ ows from the source country7. Thus, OLS
analysis does not detect a role for both tax rates to play in the determination
of FDI.
Note that the relationship in the selection equation between the proba-
bility (P) of making a new FDI and the explanatory variables (including ￿S)
7We performed also several robustness tests. For instance, we excluded the host and
source ￿nancial risk ratings from the ￿ ow equation. We also deleted the variable "previous
FDI" from both equations. The results concerning the corporate-tax rates seem quite
robust.







where ￿ represents the e⁄ect of all the other explanatory variables (held
￿xed at their sample averages), including country ￿xed e⁄ects, and ￿ is the
coe¢ cient of ￿S in the selection equation. Note also that the estimate of ￿
is positive and statistically signi￿cant. The marginal e⁄ect of ￿S on P is
@P=@￿S = ￿(2￿)
￿1=2 exp[￿(￿ + ￿￿S)
2=2] > 0:8 (3)
Figure 1 depicts the graph of the function P(￿S) for the U.S. as a source
country and four EU countries (Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and the
U.K.) as host countries. The U.S.-U.K. characteristics in the sample are such
that the estimated probability of a positive FDI ￿ ow from the U.S. to the
U.K. is one, una⁄ected by the source country (namely, U.S.) tax rate. For
all other three countries, the U.S. tax rate has a strong positive e⁄ect in
the relevant range of 0-40%. But the marginal e⁄ects of the source-country
tax rate is not the same for all three countries, being highest for Greece.
Figure 2 depicts the ￿ ow equation for the U.S., as a source country, and
the four EU countries as host countries. The host-country tax rate seems to
have a negative e⁄ect at all rates, including the very high rates that approach
100%. Notably, the tax rate of the U.K. (as a host country) has a very strong
negative marginal e⁄ect, whereas in the tax rate of Greece has a relatively
small marginal e⁄ect.
8To complete the picture, note also that P(￿S) has an in￿ ection point at ￿S = ￿￿=￿:
94 Conclusion
We analyze the e⁄ects of taxes on bilateral FDI ￿ ows. Evidently, economists
and pacemakers reckon with the fact that taxes do a⁄ect economic interna-
tional ￿ ows of goods and capital. Bilateral FDI ￿ ows are no exception. Our
aim is to bring out the special mechanisms through which taxes in￿ uence
FDI, when investment decisions are likely to be two-fold because of the ex-
istence of ￿xed setup costs of new investments. Speci￿cally, for each pair of
source-host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate
FDI ￿ ows will occur, and a di⁄erent set of factors determining the volume
of FDI ￿ ows, given that they at all occur. We demonstrate that the notion
that the mere international tax di⁄erentials are the main factors behind the
direction and magnitude of FDI ￿ ows is too simple. We hypothesize that the
source-country tax rate works primarily on the selection process, whereas
the host-country tax rate a⁄ects mainly the magnitude of the FDI, once
they occur9. Analyzing an international panel data of 24 OECD countries,
we bring empirical evidence, using selection bias methods, in support of this
hypothesis.
9This ￿nding has some bearing on the nature of international tax competition, as is
evident from the citation at the beginning of the paper; for an overview of the traditional
analysis of international taxation see, for instance, Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991), Wil-
son (1999), and Hau￿ er (2001).
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13Table 1: Frequency of Source-Host Positive Flows by Countries
Country Source Host Country Source Host
Australia 0:43 0:41 Korea 0:09 0:39
Austria 0:66 0:38 Mexico 0:00 0:33
Belgium 0:03 0:56 Netherlands 0:68 0:54
Canada 0:62 0:41 New Zealand 0:00 0:34
Denmark 0:35 0:46 Norway 0:64 0:33
Finland 0:65 0:34 Portugal 0:00 0:49
France 0:94 0:52 Spain 0:02 0:51
Germany 0:98 0:54 Sweden 0:84 0:45
Greece 0:00 0:36 Switzerland 0:27 0:47
Ireland 0:00 0:49 Turkey 0:02 0:36
Italy 0:81 0:46 United Kingdom 0:91 0:58
Japan 0:96 0:41 United States 0:87 0:64
14Table 2: Data Sources
Variables: Source:
Import of Goods Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF
FDI In￿ ows International Direct Investment Database, OECD
Unit Value of Manufactured Exports World Economic Outlook, IMF
Population International Financial Statistics, IMF
Distance Shang Jin Wel￿ s Website: www.nber.org/~wei
Bilateral Telephone Tra¢ c Direction of Tra¢ c:
Trends in International Telephone Tari⁄s,
International Communication Union
International Telecommunication Union
Educational Attainment Barro-Lee Dataset: www.nber.org/N....
ICRG Index of Financially Sound Ashoka Mody, IMF
Ratings (inverse of ￿nancial risk)
Corporate Tax Rates World Tax Database (University of Michigan)
http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/worldtaxdatabase.htm
15Table 3: The E⁄ects of Host and Source Corporate-Tax Rates
on FDI
Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection














































































Number of Observations 851 2116 2116 2116
16Notes:
(a) All estimations include country and time ￿xed e⁄ects
(b) Robust standard errors appear in parentheses
￿ Indicates signi￿cance at the ￿ve percent level;
￿￿ Indicates signi￿cance at the one percent level;
1 In fractions
2 In logs, lagged one period
3 In average years of schooling, lagged one period
4 One for common language; zero otherwise
5 In logs
6 Lagged one period
7 One for existence of previous FDI; zero otherwise
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